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There is a long history of crossover between international trade rules and guidelines on 
international food aid shipments.  This crossover has been a frequent point of 
contention and remains unresolved in World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations.  
Recent Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations have included lengthy 
discussions on food aid, and despite the uncertainty of the DDA, there is momentum 
towards developing new international disciplines and guidelines for food aid shipments.  
 
On one level, there is an inherent conflict between guidelines that ensure the viability of 
food aid and trade rules that discipline shipments.  Development advocates seek food 
aid guidelines that ensure delivery of adequate and beneficial deliveries, while policy 
makers from competing agricultural exporting countries seek to discipline the use of 
food aid as a vent for surplus disposal to ensure that it does not become a means of 
circumventing export competition disciplines.  Despite the progress that was made over 
the past few years in these areas, it appears as though the DDA negotiations will not 
accomplish either goal.   
 
Food aid disciplines that emerge from a trade agreement may not tell the whole story of 
how food aid shipments may be affected, however.  Rules that govern export subsidies 
and credits may play important roles in the size and disposition of food aid shipments.  
Export subsidy and credit arrangements have been the primary vents for agricultural 
surpluses for several years, and WTO member countries were poised to phase out the 
use of agricultural export subsidies and to curtail the use of export credit arrangements 
in the DDA.  The possibility of tighter disciplines on export subsidies and credits would 
apply increased pressure on food aid as a means of surplus disposal.  If subsidy and 
credit allowances were to be curtailed to a greater degree than domestic support 
programmes that create agricultural surpluses, then there may be an increase in the 
use of food aid shipments as a tool of surplus disposal.  This could happen despite the 
inclusion of explicit food aid rules in a trade agreement.   
 
This paper presents the institutional background for food aid procurement and delivery, 
with particular emphasis on the United States (US).  The US is by far the largest donor 
of international food aid, and it has been accused of being the worst offender of using 
food aid as a tool of surplus disposal (Barrett and Maxwell).  The historical background 
of food aid as a tool of surplus disposal is presented, along with some empirical 
observations.  A conceptual model is then developed that provides the framework for an 
empirical investigation into how changes in the use of one surplus disposal vent has 
affected changes in other vents.  The empirical model is discussed in the context of the 
DDA draft modalities, with respect to how changes in export subsidy and credit 
allowances may affect food aid shipments. 
 
2.0 AGRICULTURAL  SURPLUSES AND SURPLUS DISPOSAL 
The public acquisition of agricultural stocks has a long history in the US.  The 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) was incorporated in 1933 and it is charged with 
the role of administering loans, purchase programmes and other operations “required in 
  1the production and marketing of agricultural commodities” (USDA, 1999).  The CCC 
Board of Directors consists of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) officers 
who oversee the CCC’s support, inventory, disposal and export programmes.   
Traditionally, the primary avenue through which the CCC acquires commodity stocks is 
nonrecourse support loans to primary producers.  Nonrecourse loans are provided to 
producers, who are then afforded the option of either repaying the principal and interest 
or of forfeiting the commodity that served as collateral.  In cases where the commodity’s 
market price is below the current US loan rate, producers generally forfeit the collateral, 
thus adding to the CCC’s stocks.  However, the USDA’s loan deficiency payment 
program has tempered the CCC’s acquisition of stocks.  Producers can now choose to 
receive a deficiency payment that covers the difference between the loan rate and the 
market rate, in lieu of forfeiting their crops.   
  
Support for dairy producers comes through an intervention programme in which the 
CCC purchases butter, cheese and skim milk powder (SMP) from processors and 



























































































  2Once the CCC has acquired stocks, it is faced with either storing or disposing of its 
surplus.  Because of the high direct and opportunity costs of holding stocks, it is in the 
interest of the CCC to dispose of its agricultural surpluses.  However the manner in 
which the CCC disposes of its surplus has the potential to undo the effects of the 
programmes that created the surplus by flooding the domestic market with commodities, 
thus pushing down prices.  It is in the interest, then, of both the CCC and domestic US 
producers to dispose of public stocks in a manner that does not negatively affect 
domestic commodity prices.   
 
To do so, the CCC makes an effort to dispose of its surplus agricultural commodities as 
additional consumption; i.e. consumption that would not have occurred in the absence 
of the CCC programme.  The disposal takes two primary forms, export programmes and 
food aid.
1  Each is discussed below. 
 
The CCC’s export programmes are comprised of export credit programmes and export 
subsidies.  Both are administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service of the USDA.   
Export credit programmes include Export Credit Guarantees (GSM 102 and 103
2), the 
Supplier Credit Guarantee Program and the Facility Guarantee Program.  All of these 
programmes provide credit guarantees to US banks or exporters in the event of default 
on the part of the importer.  Consumption that arises from export credit programmes 
may be “additional” in the sense that export guarantees might relax liquidity constraints 
in importing countries that would not otherwise be able to secure the requisite credit to 
import US commodities (Rude and Gervais). 
 
The CCC operates two export subsidy programmes, the Export Enhancement Program 
(EEP) and the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP).  The USDA pays cash bonuses 
directly to exporters in an effort to allow sale of US commodities in markets where 
international prices are below what the exporter pays to acquire the products.  The EEP, 
though still on the books, has not been used for more than ten years; US agricultural 
export subsidies are currently applied only to dairy.  Export subsidies are provided 
under the rationale that US producers could not compete with foreign-subsidised 
products in some markets without subsidies. 
 
The US administers a myriad of food aid programmes that are aimed at addressing a 
range of domestic and foreign policy goals.  The first US food aid programme was 
administered in 1954 under Public Law 480 (PL 480).  PL 480 aid is comprised of three 
categories, or titles: Title I consists of bilateral government-to-government aid and is 
primarily a tool of surplus disposal and market development, Title II aid is primarily 
emergency food aid which is either transferred government-to-government or 
channelled through aid agencies, and Title III aid is monetised for balance-of-payments 
relief.
 3  Other US aid programmes include Food for Progress (food aid to countries that 
                                                 
1 The CCC also operates domestic assistance programmes that provide commodities to the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, the armed forces, correctional facilities and a range of charities.   
2 GSM 103 is to be discontinued as a result of the Brazilian cotton case. 
3 Monetised food aid is donated to a recipient-country government, which then sells the food on the local 
market.  Proceeds from the sale provide the recipient government with balance-of-payments relief or may 
be used to fund long-run projects. 
  3undertake market-based and democratic reforms) and Section 416(b) aid, which 
donates CCC surplus stocks in grant form.  The USDA’s Farm Services Administration 
(FSA) procures all commodities for US food aid programmes and the USDA’s Foreign 
Agricultural Services office and US Agency for International Development are 
responsible for dispensing commodities to recipient countries and non-governmental 
organisations.   
 
The use of food aid as a vent for surplus disposal was first analysed by Nobel laureate 
Theodore Schultz in 1960.  Schultz conducted an analysis of the benefits to US 
agricultural industries of disposing of surplus commodities by means of PL 480 
programmes during the 1950s.  The most famous and long-lasting result from Schultz’s 
seminal paper is the possibility that food aid may be detrimental to the recipient country 
by depressing local food prices and creating production disincentive effects 
(“Schultzian” effects).  However, the primary objective of the paper was to evaluate the 
cost and the effectiveness of food aid as a tool of surplus disposal.  The early policy 
environment surrounding PL 480 aid is exemplified in a quote from Harold D. Cooly, 
chairman of the Committee on Agriculture of the US House of Representatives, who 
stated “We are primarily interested in getting rid of these surpluses and we don’t care 
how you do it and under what authority.  We have told you we want the commodities 
sold for dollars first and then for foreign currencies or then donate them.” (US House of 
Representatives) 
 
US food aid policy has evolved beyond surplus disposal over the past 40 years to 
include project aid and greater involvement of multilateral donor organisations.   
However US food aid policy is still viewed as being driven largely by domestic policy 
motivations.  A study by Diven analyses the relationship between donor-country 
agricultural policy interests and food aid shipments.  US aid shipments are modelled as 
a function of donor stocks, donor exports, lagged aid shipments and recipient country 
grain production.  There are three key results in Diven’s analysis.  The first is that aid 
shipments are strongly positively correlated with donor stocks.  That is, US aid 
shipments rise in years of high carryover stocks.  Second, US aid shipments are 
incremental; a given period’s aid delivery is highly dependent on the previous period’s 
shipments. Finally, aid shipments are shown to be positively related to grain production 
in the recipient country.  Such a finding runs contrary to philanthropic motives.  Diven 
concludes that “US food aid flows have consistently served the interests of [domestic] 
commodity producers.”  Barrett and Maxwell confirm the link between US surplus 
disposal and food aid policy by noting that food aid shipments are more closely 
correlated to domestic stocks now than at any time in the past because Congress has 
begun to issue “emergency” appropriations for the CCC to purchase commodities and 
ship them as aid in response to weak domestic commercial markets.  Figure 2 illustrates 
the close correlation between US food aid flows and domestic stocks.   
 
3.0  FOOD AID AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
Disquiet over the use of food aid as a tool of surplus disposal predates its formal 
inclusion in trade negotiations.  The United Nation’s (UN) Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) convened the Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal  















































































(CSSD) in 1954 in an effort to monitor member countries’ food aid practices.  There are 
two key principles that govern the CSSD.  The first is the maintenance of Usual 
Marketing Requirements in aid-recipient countries.  Usual Marketing Requirements are 
an attempt to ensure that food aid provides wholly additional consumption; that is, food 
aid should not displace commercial imports.  Usual Marketing Requirements are 
generally operationalised by comparing current-year commercial food imports (during 
which food aid is received) to a five-year historical average.  If current-year imports fall 
below the average, then food aid is presumed to have displaced commercial trade and 
Usual Marketing Requirements are not satisfied.  The second core principle of the 
CSSD is that donor countries notify the CSSD of all food aid shipments.  This second 
principle has gone largely unfulfilled, as the share of aid reported to the CSSD has been 
dropping since its inception (figure 3).
4  Two important points are worth making about 
the CSSD.  First, the CSSD does not have a development agenda; it is intended as an 
oversight tool for the disposition of surplus as food aid.  Second, its principles are non 
binding and are unenforceable. 
 
Food aid made its first appearance as part of an international trade agreement during 
the Kennedy Round trade negotiations in 1967.  The International Wheat Agreement 
was negotiated under the auspices of the Kennedy Round as an attempt to stabilise 
international trade in grains, and included a parallel Food Aid Convention.  The Food 
Aid Convention was a non-enforceable agreement between signatory countries for  
                                                 
4 The jump in 2003 is the result of the US reporting four years of aid in one year. 
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  Figure 3. Food Aid Notified to the Consultative 






























minimum annual food aid donations, and has been renewed several times over the past 
40 years.  The current convention has been extended to July 2007 in the hope that the 
DDA negotiations will be completed before a new convention has to be convened.   
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) is the first such agreement to 
address agricultural trade, and contains specific reference to food aid.  Article 10 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture provides guidelines that signatories are to follow to prevent 
the circumvention of export subsidy commitments.  The first of these guidelines calls for 
food aid to be untied; that is, aid should not be dependent on procurement from a 
specific country (usually the donor) or group of countries.  This guideline has been 
widely flouted by donor countries.  A mere 12-15 percent of food aid is untied, using the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) definition of “tied 
aid”.  Approximately 67 percent of non-food aid is untied (Clay).  Canada has recently 
changed its procurement policy to allow 50 percent of its food aid budget to be spent on 
purchases from a list of eligible developing countries.  While still officially “tied” 
(because there is a list of eligible source countries), this policy change represents a 
movement towards the spirit of the Uruguay Round food aid principles.   
 
The second guideline to emerge from the URAA defers to the FAO’s “Principles of 
Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations” as outlined by the CSSD.  This 
guideline calls for the maintenance of Usual Marketing Requirements and the reporting 
of aid shipments.  This last guideline has generally been ignored by signatories, as 
discussed above.  The third guideline calls for food aid to be provided in grant form, as 
opposed to sold under credit or subsidy arrangements.  Most donors comply with this 
  6guideline with the notable exception of the US which provides up to 20 percent of its 
food aid as concessional sales (Young).  
  
Despite the growing emphasis on food aid in trade negotiations, it is WTO rules on 
export competition that might have the most significant effects on food aid shipments.  
Export subsidies and credits have historically been used to dispose of domestic 
agricultural surpluses.  Stricter trade rules that reduce allowable levels of export credits 
and eliminate export subsidies might increase the pressure for disposal of domestic 
surpluses through other channels.  There are two primary vents for domestic agricultural 
surpluses besides export subsidies and credits; food aid and storage.  Food aid is 
preferred by donors for several reasons.  First, the donor nation receives political capital 
in return for donating food aid.  This capital can come in the form of a public perception 
that the donor government is providing necessary humanitarian assistance, or in the 
form of political and/or social concessions from the recipient country.  Food aid has 
been shown to be a function of donor country political motives, driven by closeness of 
economic and military ties between donor and recipient (Zahariadis, Travis and Ward).  
Second, politicians who set food aid policy and budgets are subject to a strong maritime 
transportation lobby who are in positions to win contracts to ship food aid to overseas 
destinations (Barrett and Maxwell).  Storage of commodities provides no political or 
social benefits to the donor and entails substantial storage costs.  Storage is a last 
resort for the CCC and the minimisation of storage costs is a frequent motivation for 
USDA policies.  
    
The URAA negotiations produced disciplines on agricultural export subsidies in an effort 
to curtail the use of this primary surplus vent.  Article 9 of the URAA committed member 
countries to bound levels of export subsidies, measured in both quantity and value, and 
instituted schedules of reduction over a six-year implementation period.  The base 
period at which subsidies were bound was 1986 to 1990, which was a period of high 
export subsidies.  The bound levels of subsidies were so high that the constraint was 
not typically binding and there was substantial “water” (unused allowable subsidies) in 
the disciplines.  The use of export subsidies has declined significantly (except for dairy 
trade), but it is unclear if URAA export subsidy disciplines had the effect of increasing 
pressure on an alternative vent (i.e., food aid) because of the water in subsidy 
disciplines.  This point is addressed further in a later section of the paper. 
 
The URAA does not contain disciplines on export credits.  As such, there remains 
relatively undisciplined access to three primary vents for domestic agricultural surplus 
(export credits, food aid and storage) under the current agreement.  We now turn to 
what future trade negotiations may hold for food aid. 
 
The status of the DDA trade negotiations is murky, at best.  The collapse of talks in July 
2006 makes it very unlikely that an agreement can be reached before George Bush’s 
Trade Promotion Authority expires in July 2007.  While one cannot be certain of the final 
form that export competition and food aid rules might take in the DDA (or, in the event of 
its total collapse, the DDA’s successor), ministerial declarations and draft modalities 
produced by the WTO over the past few years provide some insight into the future 
relationship between food aid and the WTO.  The most contentious issues in the DDA 
negotiations on agriculture are market access and domestic support, not export 
  7competition (specifically, not food aid).  Even if the DDA collapses entirely, it is likely 
that any food aid and export competition disciplines in a future agreement will resemble 
the proposed modalities that have been generated as part of the DDA.  It is therefore 
worthwhile to examine the proposed disciplines.   
 
The most recent draft modalities from the DDA negotiations indicate that export 
subsidies were likely to be eliminated entirely.  Subsidy volumes and values were to be 
bound and reduced according to a schedule, and eliminated by 2013.  Export credits 
were likely to be disciplined as well in an effort to bring their use more in line with 
commercial transactions.  The common themes that emerged during the DDA were: 1) 
imposition of a maximum repayment period (36 months), 2) a minimum interest rate 
(perhaps the London Interbank Offered Rate - as a reference) and 3) a requirement that 
credit programmes be self financing and not reliant on government support.  Export 
credit arrangements that do not meet these requirements would be considered export 
subsidies and be prohibited. (WTO, 2005) 
 
The draft modalities do not set out implementation schedules for export credit 
disciplines, and the uncertainty surrounding the DDA makes timing even more 
ambiguous.  The modalities do, however, make clear that the availability of export 
subsidies and credits as vents for domestic agricultural surplus will decrease with a new 
WTO agreement.  If food aid is an alternative vent for this surplus, then increased 
pressure may emerge on that vent, ceteris paribus.  Any new WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture is likely to affect domestic production and therefore surpluses, however, 
leaving pressure for surplus disposal not-so-paribus.  As domestic support is one of the 
most contentious issues in current DDA negotiations, the degree to which domestic 
overproduction will be affected is uncertain.  The URAA called for scheduled reductions 
in domestic support over the 1995 to 2000 implementation period, and a new 
agreement is likely to require further cuts in domestic Aggregate Measurement of 
Support (AMS) over an implementation period (Brink).  Whether the required cuts in 
domestic AMS will be large enough to reduce domestic surpluses by an amount 
commensurate with required reductions in export competition measures remains to be 
seen, and will ultimately be an empirical question.   
 
The DDA draft modalities also contain provisions that outline the direction that food aid 
disciplines are likely to take.  But it is important to note that the inclusion of food aid 
rules in an Agreement on Agriculture is the result of competing interests.  On one hand, 
the DDA is referred to as the “Doha Development Round”, implying that one of the 
primary motivations of member nations is to improve the lot of developing countries.  As 
such, any rules on food aid are likely to tread carefully so as to not jeopardise 
legitimately-needed food aid.  Also, signatories are likely to be wary of limiting food aid 
shipments for fear of further tarnishing the WTO’s public image.   
 
On the other hand, the notion that food aid is used as a tool of surplus disposal has 
become generally accepted.  Competing agricultural exporters seem determined to 
curtail the use of food aid as a means of skirting export subsidy and credit disciplines.  A 
set of draft guidelines has emerged from DDA negotiations which walk the fine line 
between restricting the use of aid as a tool of surplus disposal and ensuring that 
legitimate aid is not impeded.   
  8 
The proposal that permeates the draft modalities and Chair’s Reference Papers is the 
creation of a “safe box” for emergency food aid.  The safe box is a classification for food 
aid that would not be subject to WTO disciplines, akin to “green box” for domestic 
support programmes.  The stumbling block for this proposal, however, is determining 
under what circumstances food aid would qualify for the safe box.  It appears as though 
an appeal from either the recipient country, the International Committee for the Red 
Cross or a UN Consolidated Appeal would be the “bedrock standards” for conformity 
with the safe box (Chair’s reference paper, April 11, 2006).  There remains some debate 
about whether appeals from non-governmental agencies such as Medicines Sans 
Frontiers or OXFAM would warrant classification as “safe box” aid.   
 
The draft modalities also contain reference to non-emergency (i.e. programme and 
project) food aid, though most of these proposals are enclosed in the ubiquitous square  
brackets, which convey that anything contained therein is preliminary and likely to 
change.  Proposals include: allowing programme food aid only when based on an 
assessment of need by a third-party, improved targeting of recipients, and phasing out 
programme aid by 2013.  This last proposal is particularly ambitious, and would spell 
the end of the majority of US PL 480 shipments.  The modalities also pay lip service to 
notification requirements.  The low level of compliance with the CSSD indicates that 
such a requirement may go unfulfilled, however.  Another proposal calls for an end to 
monetised aid. 
 
What would the draft modalities mean for the future of food aid shipments?  The most 
specific proposals are for emergency food aid, which has historically been less 
controversial from a surplus-disposal perspective than programme aid.  The proposed 
modalities for programme food aid do have the potential to markedly reduce programme 
aid shipments, however the vagaries in the draft documents are so substantial that 
programme food aid may remain unaffected.  It seems unlikely that the US would 
accept terms that would limit its authority to disperse programme food aid without a third 
party assessment.  The effects of a DDA agreement on export subsidies and credits are 
clearer.  The proposed disciplines would have ultimately reduced shipments under such 
arrangements.  The effects of reduced subsidy and credit shipments on food aid are the 
focus of the next chapter.   
 
4.0 MODEL 
We now turn to the formulation of a conceptual model to explain how changes in the 
use of one surplus disposal vent (i.e. export credits and subsidies) could affect 
commodity volumes that flow through an alternative vent (i.e. food aid).   An empirical 
application of the conceptual model follows. 
 
The Uruguay Round implementation phase of 1995-2000 provides a unique snapshot of 
a period in which allowable export subsidies were decreased according to The 
Agreement’s disciplines.  At first blush, it would seem reasonable to investigate a causal 
relationship between reductions in allowable export subsidies and changes in food aid 
shipments over that period.  The nature of the URAA scheduled reductions make the 
  9investigation of such a relationship impossible, however.  Export subsidies were bound 
at levels high enough so that not all member countries were utilising all of their 
allowable allotments.  Reductions in allowable subsidies did not, therefore, necessarily 
translate into reductions in actual subsidies.  This is the “water” that was discussed 
earlier in the paper.   
 
An alternative method of modelling the effects of changes in one surplus vent on other 
vents is to investigate the time-series relationships that exist between the data.  Before 
proceeding to the empirical model, however, it is worth providing a conceptual 
framework that links WTO agreements to food aid shipments.  The conceptual model is 
based on the institutional structure of the US and the empirical application utilises US 
data.  Figure 4 illustrates the important causal links that connect WTO rules to food aid 
shipments.  A new Agreement on Agriculture would include rules on domestic support, 
export competition and market access.  Disciplines on domestic support will affect 
domestic AMS, which is one of the determinants (dashed line indicates that there are 
also other determining factors) of domestic commodity production.  Domestic production 
is sold commercially as either domestic consumption or exports, and the remainder is 
domestic surplus.  As discussed above, the CCC has three primary outlets for its share 
of surplus commodities; sell under export subsidy or credit arrangements, ship as food 
aid or store as carry-over stocks.  Agreement on Agriculture rules on export competition 
will be a partial determinant (dashed line) of how the CCC’s surplus is apportioned 
between these three vents.  Specifically, if a new Agreement on Agriculture includes 
disciplines on export subsidies and credits or on food aid, then such rules will affect 
member countries’ export competition and food aid policies.   
 
An Agreement on Agriculture that includes tighter disciplines on, say, export subsidies 
would increase pressure on other vents, ceteris paribus.  As a result, there is an 
endogenous relationship between the vents contained in the circle.  Changes in the 
volume of commodities pushed through one vent are presumed to trigger changes in 
the volume that is pushed through the other two vents.
5
 
There is also the prospect for the distribution of surplus disposal between these vents to 
be affected by exogenous factors.  The situation in which there is an unusually large call 
from the international community for emergency food aid is likely the most important of 
these factors.  Such a call could lead to a large change in food aid shipments; a change 
that is not due to the endogenous relationships between the surplus vents.  The 
conceptual diagram in figure 4 includes the US foreign aid budget to control for such 
circumstances.   
 
The objective of the empirical portion of this study is to quantify the endogenous 
relationships between the surplus disposal vents to determine if changes in the use of 
one vent have affected the use of other vents.  Such information can provide insight into 
whether US food aid has been used as an alternative vent to export credits or subsidies, 
and whether new disciplines on subsidies and credits from a trade agreement are likely 
to affect US food aid shipments.  The most informative method of modelling 
                                                 
5 The directions and meanings of the endogenous arrows in figure 4 are explained more thoroughly within 
the description of the empirical model. 
  10endogenous relationships is to test for statistical relationships between the relevant 
variables with a vector autoregression (VAR).  A VAR explains movements in a group of 
endogenous variables through changes in lags of the endogenous variables and by 
current-period exogenous variables.  The VAR provides econometric estimates of the 
size of the effects of changes in one endogenous variable on changes in the other 
endogenous variables.  However, since a shock to one variable in a VAR is transmitted 
to all endogenous variables, estimated coefficients do not convey the complete picture.  
Impulse response (IR) functions are derived that trace out the effects of a one-time 
shock to one of the errors. 
 
A few important points are worth noting.  First, the objective of this empirical application 
is to flesh out the effects of one endogenous variable on the other endogenous 
variables, not to explain the size of US commodity production or the size of the 
domestic commodity surplus.  The policy decision analysed in this study is the selection 
of outlet.  Second, the variables that make up the commodity surplus (discussed below 
in the data section) do not comprise a singular system.  The use of the VAR 
methodology allows an examination of the relationships between endogenous variables 
without having to explain the disposition of the entire surplus.  This means that if a 
decrease in export subsidy shipments of 100 tonnes is imposed on the VAR, then the 
other vents (food aid and carry-over stocks) do not necessarily have to increase by 100 
tonnes in the same period.  The VAR simply conveys historical estimates of how the 
group of endogenous variables move together.  This point is particularly important 
because, while surplus CCC stocks have been an important source for PL 480 Title II, 
Section 416(b) and Food for Progress aid, a portion of US food aid shipments are 
procured from private stocks.
6  The VAR methodology is also appealing because one 
need not develop a behavioural model for every endogenous variable independently to 
estimate how changes in one variable affects the system’s other endogenous variables.   
 
The structural-form VAR for a specific commodity is represented as 
(1)  .  t t
n
i





t x  is a three by one vector of endogenous variables that includes the volume of exports 
that were shipped under subsidy or credit arrangements, food aid shipments and carry-
over stocks.    is a matrix of lagged endogenous variables, and   is 
contemporaneous development assistance spending (the exogenous factor discussed 
above).    and Π are parameter matrices to be estimated.  This structural form 
model represents the relationships between the endogenous variables and between the 
exogenous variable and the endogenous system.   
i t x − t z
i B Γ Γ , , 0
 
The structural form of equation (1) cannot be estimated in its current form because 
endogenous variable appear on both sides of the equation.  The structural form can be 
                                                 
6 The Kansas City Commodity Office of the USDA estimates that an average of just under 30% of food 
aid shipments between 1992 and 2004 were procured from USDA inventories. 
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−1 B D  and  .  Equation (2) is estimated as a 
VAR using ordinary least squares.   
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The standard form of equation (2) is under identified; the contemporaneous effects of 
parameter matrix  cannot be discerned without parameter restrictions.  Theory 
provides a structural decomposition on the system to ensure identification, however.  
Within the system of endogenous variables, there is a hierarchy by which each vent is 
utilised.  The CCC seeks first to sell its surplus under either export subsidy or credit 
arrangements.  This is the first portion of surplus that is disposed, and has direct 
contemporaneous effects (the solid lines in figure 4) on food aid shipments and carry-
over stocks.  The remainder of the surplus commodity is either shipped as food aid or 
held as carry-over stocks, with food aid being determined first.  Carry-over stocks do not 
have contemporaneous effects on the other vents.  This structural decomposition is 
operationalised by imposing the following constraint when recovering the structural form 
parameters from standard form parameter estimates: 
B
 



















Food aid has been shown to be persistent (Barrett, Mohapatra and Snyder, Diven), so 
that aid in one period begets aid in the subsequent period.  The parameter matrix  i Γ  is 
left unrestricted to account for potential lagged effects in the endogenous system.   
These are the dotted lines within the circle of endogenous variables in figure 4.    
 
It is worth making an important point about using VAR analysis for the current research.  
The objective of the current paper is to test for and estimate dynamic endogenous 
relationships between a group of proposed vents for surplus disposal.  Once these 
relationships are determined, one can infer how changes in the use of one vent (as a 
result of a trade agreement) may affect the use of others.  A new WTO agreement 
would presumably establish new trade rules, thereby introducing the Lucas critique 
(Lucas) to the analysis.  The importance of the Lucas critique in VAR analysis is a 
subject of debate (Stock and Watson, Rudebusch), but it is important to note that the 
current analysis does not attempt to forecast how commodity shipments under subsidy 
and credit arrangements would change after a DDA agreement.  The goal is to 
understand if export subsidies, credits and food aid have been used as alternative vents 
in the past, and to provide empirical estimates of the effects.  Such knowledge is 
valuable in forming policies and rules whose purpose is to avoid circumvention of export 
competition disciplines.   
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Figure 4. Conceptual Model 
WTO Agreements


















5.0 EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
The empirical VAR is estimated for US wheat, which is the most important food aid 
commodity.  The data are annual observations and are from a variety of USDA sources.  
Export credit data comprise CCC export credit programmes, which are taken from 
  13Wheat: Background for 1995 US Farm Legislation (USDA, 1995) and from the annual 
Wheat Yearbook.  Export subsidy data are taken from the Wheat Yearbook and include 
EEP shipments from 1986 to 1996.
7  CCC ending stock data are from USDA’s Wheat 
Situation and Outlook Yearbook, 2006.  Food aid data are from the USDA’s Wheat 
Yearbook, and include all concessional and grant food aid programmes.  PL 480 
shipments that were sold on concessional terms are included as food aid.
8  T h e  
exogenous control variable for unusually high (or low) levels of food aid is gross 
overseas development assistance (ODA), as reported by the OECD.  The sample 
period is 1960 to 2004.  Skim milk powder (SMP) has attracted attention of late as an 
example of food aid shipments responding to export subsidy constraints (Margulis), 
however it was not possible to obtain enough time-series data for VAR analysis of SMP.  
  
The 3 x 3 VAR is estimated in Eviews.  Wheat shipments under subsidy and credit 
arrangements, food aid and year-end CCC stocks are the system’s endogenous 
variables.  A constant and US gross ODA are exogenous variables.  The lag length of 
the VAR is selected so as ensure maximum available degrees of freedom without 
misspecifying the model.  Both the Schwarz Information Criterion and the sequential 
likelihood ratio test (Enders) indicate the inclusion of one lag of each endogenous 
variable.  The standard-form VAR of equation (2) is estimated and produces parameter 
estimates for matrices  A, C  and D as well as the composite error vector e.  Standard-
form parameter estimates are presented in table 1.  These parameters, in combination 
with the parameter restrictions of equation (3) and the estimated residual covariances, 
are used to recover the structural-form parameters of matrices   and  i B Γ Γ , , 0 Π by 
solving a set of simultaneous equations in MatLab. 
 
The contemporaneous coefficient estimates of interest, matrix  , are reported in table 2 
and are intuitively appealing at first blush.  Note that equation (1) is structured such that 
all endogenous variables appear on the left-hand side, so that positive 
B
ij β  estimates 
imply inverse relationships between the endogenous variables.  The point estimates for 
matrix   tell us that a decrease in wheat shipments under subsidy and credit 
arrangements results in a contemporaneous increase in food aid shipments.  Likewise, 
a decrease in subsidy and credit shipments pushes up carry-over stocks.  However, the 
effect on carry-over stocks is partially mitigated by the contemporaneous impact of a 
change in aid shipments on carry-over stocks (i.e. the 
B
32 β  coefficient).   
 
The primary focus is if export credits/subsidies and food aid are alternative outlets for 
surplus agricultural commodities.  VAR analysis is well suited for this task because it 
provides estimates of dynamic interactions between endogenous variables.   
Specifically, we generate IRs to observe the dynamic effects of changes in one 
endogenous variable on the system’s other endogenous variables; point estimates from 
                                                 
7 Quantities shipped under export subsidies and credits are aggregated into one variable for the empirical 
application.  While it is possible that not all of the shipments sold under credit arrangements contained a 
subsidy element, the series are aggregated to sort out the effects of an overall decline in subsidy and 
credit shipments. 
8 Food aid that is sold concessionally is not categorized as credit or subsidy shipments because the US 
currently reports such shipments as food aid, not as credit or subsidy shipments.  It is possible that a new 
WTO agreement would require that all concessional sales be reported as such, and not as food aid. 
  14table 2 tell only a part of the story.  Figure 5 illustrates the effects on food aid shipments 
and carry-over stocks of a negative shock to subsidy and credit shipments.  A reduction 
(instead of a positive shock, as is usually  analysed in VARs)  in shipments is simulated  
 
Table 1 - Standard-Form Coefficients
Dependent Variables 
Regressors  Credit/Subsidy Food Aid Carry-Over Stocks 
Constant  -2336.4540 2121.2470 3565.1920 
(-3348.27) (-1098.28) (-2509.19) 
Lagged Credit/Subsidy  0.8077 -0.0357 -0.0776 
(-0.09) (-0.03) (-0.06) 
Lagged Food Aid  -0.0914 0.5418 -0.4764 
(-0.37) (-0.12) (-0.27) 
Lagged Carry-Over Stocks  0.1525 0.1086 0.9419 
(-0.10) (-0.03) (-0.07) 
Overseas Development Assistance  0.3858 -0.0569 -0.0667 
(-0.26) (-0.09) (-0.20) 




to provide a parallel with a WTO agreement that would result in a reduction in the 
quantity of wheat shipped under such arrangements.  The IRs in figure 5 are consistent 
with expectations.  A negative shock to export subsidy/credit shipments of 
approximately 4.8 million tonnes causes a contemporaneous increase of 49 000 tonnes 
in food aid shipments.  The negative shock also has a contemporaneous effect on 
carry-over stocks of approximately 614 000 tonnes.
9  The VAR system clearly illustrates 
the offsetting relationships between three primary vents for surplus disposal.  A 
decrease in subsidy and credit shipments leads to an immediate increase in food aid 
shipments and larger carry-over stocks. 
 
Figure 5 also illustrates the dynamic effects of a negative shock to subsidy and credit 
shipments.  The lagged structure of the empirical VAR allows delayed effects of the 
shock to show up in future aid shipments and carry-over stocks.  Food aid and carry-
over stocks both follow inverted J-curve patterns.  Aid shipments jump higher in period 
one (following the initial, one-time shock in period zero) and then follow a J-curve 
pattern until approaching zero.  The lagged-response increase in food aid shipments 
could be due to a combination of the persistence of food aid and to the previous 
period’s increase in carry-over stocks (which leaves more surplus for disposal in the 
subsequent period).  Carry-over stocks also follow an inverted J-curve pattern and 
ultimately decay towards zero.  The initial shock to subsidy and credit shipments decays 
in parallel with the responding variables, and the VAR system is stable. 
 
Once the magnitudes of the effects are determined, it is important to evaluate the 
statistical and economic significance of the IRs; this is done by decomposing the IR 
variances.  Table 3 provides the percentage contribution of each endogenous variable 
to the variation in the responding variable.  The share of variation in the food aid 
                                                 
9 Recall that this is not a singular VAR; a decrease in subsidy and credit shipments need not be fully 
offset by commensurate increases in food aid shipments and carry-over stocks.   
  15response that is due to the subsidy/credit shock is approximately two percent after the 
first period.  As the effects of the shock accumulate, the share of food aid variation 
attributed to changes in subsidy and credit shipments approaches 17 percent.  An 























 Figure 5. One Standard Deviation Shock to 


















Table 2 - Contemporaneous Coefficients
Dependent Variables
Regressors Credit/Subsidy Food Aid Carry-Over Stocks
Credit/Subsidy 1 0.0103 0.1313
Food Aid 0 1 0.2536
Carry-Over Stocks 0 0 1




than the effect of subsidy/credit shipments.  The percentage of food aid’s variation that 
is due to carry-over stocks in the initial shock period is zero (because the model restricts 
the direction of causality, as in figure 4), but thereafter exceeds the effect of the 
subsidy/credit shock.  The accumulation of carry-over stocks in response to the fall in 
subsidy/credit shipments generates pressure for surplus disposal one period hence; 
pressure that is relieved through increased aid shipments.  This could be attributed to 
an institutional inability to dispose of the entire increased surplus as aid in a single 
  16period.  A very small portion of the carry-over stock response is attributed to the 
subsidy/credit shock.  This corresponds to the relatively small magnitude of the IR. 
 
The economic significance of the IRs are not entirely clear.  Consider a trade deal that 
results in credit or subsidy shipments falling one third below their most recent five-year 
average; from approximately 4 million tonnes to 2.6 million tonnes.  The immediate 
effect is an estimated increase in food aid shipments of approximately 13 000 tonnes, 
with further increases as the response follows the J-curve pattern described above.  An 
increase of 13 000 tonnes on the world wheat market is certain to have a negligible 
effect on world prices.  There is the possibility for such an increase to be important 
beyond its effect on world prices, however.  Aid shipments of 13 000 tonnes arriving in a 
single location could certainly be enough to trigger Schultzian disincentive effects.  Such 
a shipment could also, if not additional consumption, displace commercial imports and 




The future of the DDA is shaky, at best.  It is unlikely that an agreement will be ready for 
ratification before the US President’s Trade Promotion Authority expires in July of 2007, 
even if negotiations are restarted immediately.  This means that there will be no WTO-
sanctioned disciplines on food aid, and no new disciplines on agricultural export credits 
or subsidies for at least several years, despite these subjects being relatively 
uncontroversial within the Agreement on Agriculture negotiations.  What does this mean 
for food aid in the near term? 
 
The implementation period for Uruguay Round disciplines on export subsidies is past 
and there will be no new constraints imposed on their use without a DDA agreement.  
Donor countries will retain export subsidies as an option for surplus disposal subject to 
Uruguay Round limits.  Export credits will remain a second option for disposing of 
surplus commodities.  The upshot is that increased pressure that the DDA might have 
placed on food aid as a vent for surplus disposal is not likely to materialise.  Food aid 
will remain an avenue for surplus disposal, but trade rules will not push more 
commodities through that vent.   
 
There will also be no binding rules on food aid if the DDA negotiations do not 
reconvene.  The proposed safe box for emergency will not emerge and donor countries 
will not be subject to any new disciplines on their donations.  Programme aid will remain 
an option and monetisation of food aid is likely to continue.  The upshot is that food aid 
will remain an undisciplined vent for surplus agricultural products in its current form. 
 
With the WTO unlikely to develop formal food aid rules in the near term, what are the 
prospects of an alternative venue developing new food aid guidelines?  There may be 
room for another multilateral organisation to put forward some new rules on food aid.  
The current Food Aid Convention expires in July of 2007, and is an obvious venue.  
However the effectiveness of the Food Aid Convention is constrained by its nature as a 
voluntary non-binding agreement.  Non-binding agreements on food aid have a 
chequered past; for example low rates of reportage to the CSSD and the failure of 
  17countries to meet their Food Aid Convention minimum donation requirements.  This was 
part of the incentive to bring rules on food aid into the WTO - to coerce member nations 
to change their behaviour by threat of cross retaliation from other WTO agreements.   
 
Another important factor is that nations may be less willing to make concessions on 
their food aid positions outside of the reciprocal deal-making environment of the WTO.  
The US currently favours the status quo food aid environment (keeping food aid outside 
export competition disciplines) (Clay), and even though food aid rules are not the most 
controversial aspects of the Agreement on Agriculture negotiations, the US may be 
unwilling to compromise without gaining concessions from other member countries in 
other areas (ex: market access).   
 
The empirical investigation suggests that there exists an endogenous relationship 
between subsidy/credit shipments and food aid for wheat in the US.  The empirical VAR 
demonstrates a contemporaneous increase in food aid shipments as alternative vents 
constrict.  This result suggests that a trade agreement that disciplines export subsidies 
and credits may put upward pressure on food aid shipments as agricultural exporters 
vent the pressure of their domestic surpluses.  The empirical results suggest that in the 
US wheat market the effects are not large.  The same phenomenon has been noted in 
the case of skim milk powder by Margulis; skim milk powder would provide another 
interesting empirical case, were the data available. 
 
A future trade agreement, Doha or its successor, that attempts to limit the use of 
agricultural export subsidies and credits may also need to include rules on food aid to 
prevent its abuse as a vent for surplus disposal.    
 
 
Table 3 - Variance Decomposition (%)
Aid Carry-Over Stocks
Lead (years) Credit/Subsidy Carry-Over Stocks Lead (years) Credit/Subsidy Aid
1 2.1 4.2 1 5.0 1.2
5 13.2 23.1 5 9.6 6.6
9 16.9 24.9 9 10.8 8.2  
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